Abstract-Today's software is often subject to attacks that exploit vulnerabilities. Since in the area of security, vulnerabilities are hard to find, quality assurance needs detailed guidance. Focusing on early quality assurance, we propose Security Inspection Scenarios as reading support for static quality assurance. They provide detailed guidance and clear and comprehensible structuring. As the vulnerabilities are partly dependent on the operating system and programming language used, we need to build generic scenarios and instantiate them. In this paper, we show how to create Security Inspection Scenarios, accompanied by a short example demonstrating their usage. After an analysis of the possible benefits of our approach, a proposal for an evaluation is presented. We assume our scenarios support practitioners in a beneficial way and are applicable in most development lifecycles which are interested in security aspects.
INTRODUCTION
Modern software is often connected to the Internet or to a network, providing services to users spread across companies, countries, or around the world. This accessibility entails one big problem: Not only legal users are able to reach these services, anyone can. This leads to an increased threat posed by attackers, who examine the software to find and exploit weaknesses [6] .
When dealing with security, it is crucial to detect vulnerabilities before delivering the software. If insecure software is already on the market, existing vulnerabilities may have already been exploited and customers may already have been harmed.
In the area of quality assurance focusing on security, the two main approaches are security testing and security inspections, which complement each other. The first one, security testing, cannot fully cope with the special circumstances faced here. One characteristic of security is that such problems often occur in "hard-to-reach states that can be difficult to exercise by actually running the code" [1] . According to Chess and West, tools for security testing only find defects that do not require much meaningful interaction with the software.
The second approach consists of conducting security inspections. According to Chess and West, there is a consensus that code inspections have to play a major part in any software security process [1] . Inspections find defects early in the development lifecycle, even in incomplete code, unlike testing [1] . Thus, defects may be eliminated with rather limited effort compared to testing [13] [1] .
Furthermore, inspections find different defects than testing is able to find [13] . It is, for example, not possible to find defects that are masked by other defects through testing, because only one of them will show up until the corrected development artifact is retested. Moreover, testing can only discover failures, not the errors (i.e., defects) themselves [14] , and thus additional effort is required to fix this faulty behavior. Testing also does not work for certain types of vulnerabilities, for example if data is not stored in an encrypted manner, or if a weak algorithm is used, or if a program uses more access rights than necessary.
In addition, we believe that traditional software inspection approaches and existing reading support are insufficient to cope with security-related properties; in security, we face a much more complex situation. This is because "security problems occur in corner cases and are non-local. Additionally, to find security problems, inspectors have to be "able to identify a security problem" when they see one, and security problems can be "subtle and easy to overlook" [1] . Chess and West argue that understanding security issues requires security training, and thus it is best to have a security specialist as part of the inspection team [1] . Such an expert usually has developed his own tactics for approaching such situations, but these tactics are not documented, i.e., formalized and structured for use by nonexperts. Thus, there is a lack of structured approaches for security inspections for use by inspectors, who are usually not security experts, especially regarding reading support such as scenarios and guidance for inspections [4] [5] .
This paper focuses on early quality assurance and proposes Security Inspection Scenarios (SIS) as reading support to reduce vulnerabilities (such as mentioned above) in software. Such systematic reading support for checking security properties in software artifacts has been studied and developed less and has scarcely been made available. Howard, for example, presents a process for performing code reviews and mentions five typical vulnerabilities and how to address them [5] . However, the approach presented by Howard is on a very high-level and much security knowledge is necessary to perform a suitable security review. A second example is given by Elberzhager et al., who present an example of security checklists [3] . This topdown approach focuses on security goals, which is slightly different than the bottom-up approach presented here. Moreover, the checklists presented in [3] did not fit when addressing vulnerabilities, which led us to use a different reading technique and to develop the SIS. McGraw summarizes this situation when he argues that software security is a relatively new field and thus, best practices, known vulnerabilities, and techniques for how to build secure systems and how to analyze them are still on a basic level and have to develop further [8] .
Consequently, our approach addresses the problems mentioned above and provides inspectors with the knowledge and guidance necessary to conduct a code inspection focusing on security issues. Because "the danger lies in the way" inspectors "treat the ambiguous code" [1] , our scenarios provide detailed explanations and examples to reduce such ambiguities and to guide the inspector through a systematically conducted security inspection.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next Section discusses related work and separates those concepts from the approach presented here. Sections 3 and 4 show how to create and use SIS, followed by a short example in Section 5. Section 6 presents an analysis of the approach regarding benefits and drawbacks. Our proposal for an evaluation is shown in Section 7. This paper ends with the conclusion and an outlook on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
An inspection is a systematic static quality assurance technique applied to development artifacts. To facilitate inspections, different kinds of reading support have been developed. Besides ad hoc reading (i.e., no support is given to an inspector), the main forms of reading support are checklists [7] and scenarios.
Scenarios are formulated in natural text and contain three parts. An Introduction sets the focus for the inspection by explaining the task an inspector has to fulfill. An Instructions part explains what to look for and how to find the relevant elements. The Questions part contains questions to help find defects during the inspection.
Scenarios ask inspectors to produce additional results beyond checking whether a certain element is present or not. In this way, they motivate active work with the document instead of just reading it passively. It is assumed that inspectors thereby gain a better understanding of the topic.
Regarding scenarios, perspective-based reading [7] , usage-based reading [2] , and defect-based reading [9] can be distinguished. Perspective-based reading sets an individual focus for each inspector by using the specific interests of different users, i.e., stakeholders. Each scenario focuses on one perspective, describes the interests and quality requirements of these stakeholders, and guides the inspector to ensure the respective quality attributes.
Usage-based reading is based on use cases. Each scenario is focused on certain usages. Inspectors examine the artifact to detect if and how the use cases are implemented.
Finally, defect-based reading focuses on certain defect classes. Inspectors get explanations about the defect classes chosen, and are shown what to do and how to look for instances of such defects. Only few studies exist that evaluate this reading technique. Moreover, they focus on requirements documents and therefore use scenarios for finding requirements defects, such as ambiguities and incorrect functional descriptions [9] . Security Inspection Scenarios belong to the category of defect-based reading.
III. CONSTRUCTION
To perform inspections efficiently, it is usually necessary to apply expert knowledge regarding both the problem and the engineering domain, i.e., the software examined. This expertise is normally provided by the scenario used. This enables inspectors without any or with only little expert knowledge to correctly inspect a document. One of the problems is that the closer one gets to the code level, the more detailed knowledge regarding the software, or engineering in general, is necessary. Providing the right amount of information that is sufficient but not too much to manage is a challenge we address with our approach.
On the other hand, scenarios for security inspections need very detailed explanations and a high degree of guidance for inspectors. To be able to provide detailed knowledge while retaining manageability, every scenario focuses on a single vulnerability class. Our scenarios describe the problem and the threat related to it, and provide detailed instructions on how to detect instances of the vulnerability class covered.
During our research for the European Research Project SHIELDS [10] , we found out that it is both sensible and necessary to instantiate scenarios. The problem is that, depending on the programming language used and the target operating system, the answers to questions vary, different possibilities for implementing a certain behavior exist, and certain problems arise or are not existent. Our scenarios provide examples whenever an answer to a question is dependent on such conditions.
To get the necessary security knowledge and to develop the reading support, the scenarios are derived from Vulnerability Inspection Diagrams (VIDs), which contain this expertise, but do not guide a non-expert with respect to security. Figure 1 shows a rather simple example of a VID for unchecked error conditions. VIDs are processed similar to activity diagrams. The upper left section shows the start, which leads to the other sections. These other two sections are equivalent; one is a short and the other a detailed version of the same activity. The sections are called "procedures". In each procedure, inspectors start at the "begin" symbol and follow the arrows. Diamonds present decision points. Here, inspectors follow the arrow labeled according to their answers. When they have identified vulnerabilities, they are instructed to describe their findings. Further details are explained in [11] [12] .
Security Inspection Scenarios as reading support consist of three sections: Introduction, Instructions, and Questions. Each introduction clarifies the problem domain and explains to what extent certain elements or behaviors may lead to a problem and which impacts this problem entails. Questions serve to identify critical elements, and the instructions are guidance.
Both the Instructions and the Questions sections are divided into a general section and one or more focused subsections. This is because VIDs may be rather complex. To reduce complexity, we try to partition them into subsections that can be examined separately.
The main challenge is to produce subsections that are distinct and coherent, e.g., in terms of thematic coherence. It is crucial that the partitioning makes sense to the inspector, as the inspector has to follow this scheme. Additionally, in every situation, the decision about which subsection to process must be unambiguous. The subsections in one scenario may separate sequential workflows or parallel and independent workflows.
As an example, consider the VID shown in Figure 1 . In our example, the VID "Unchecked Error Condition" may be partitioned into the two subsections "try-/catch-blocks" and "special values". This is shown in Figure 2 .
Since the necessary processing of errors can only be done in the two ways shown, the dissection into "try-catch-blocks" and "special values" is complete and creates two distinct subsections. Additionally, since these sections are also coherent but clearly distinguishable, an inspector may accept and follow this dissection. As there is no interaction between the two subsections, complexity is indeed reduced.
Another important aspect for reducing complexity is not to create too many subsections within one scenario and not to incorporate too many questions per subsection. This, of course, depends on the complexity of the underlying VID. However, to get manageable subsections, we believe there should not be more than five questions per subsection. Figures 3 and 4 show a complete scenario for the inspection regarding unchecked error conditions. We will now take a detailed look at the sections of a scenario and show how to derive its contents based on a Vulnerability Inspection Diagram.
IV. SECURITY INSPECTION SCENARIOS
In both the Instructions and the Questions parts, the scenarios contain different sections according to the partitioning of the corresponding VIDs. The questions reside in the same section as in the partitioned VID. At the beginning of each scenario, general information regarding the artifact (i.e., the document type this scenario applies to) and the vulnerability class is given.
A. Introduction
Based on VIDs, each introduction of a scenario describes the underlying security problem in natural language. It is stated which vulnerability class is examined and how an attacker could exploit such a weakness, ideally combined with concrete applications and examples. This expertise has to be derived from a VID.
It is crucial also to explain the interaction between various conditions, as this interaction may or may not result in a vulnerability. Thus, an incomplete or wrong understanding may lead to improper inspections. This could result in a false sense of security, with vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a remaining attacker, or in false positives.
B. Instructions
The following part, the Instructions, shows the steps to be taken in the form of explanations and examples. They begin with some general advice and then give detailed instructions.
The Instructions part is closely related to the Questions part. The questions for the Questions part of the scenarios may be extracted almost directly from the VIDs. However, the explanation of those questions is problematic, i.e., what exactly has to be done to answer them. It is advisable to accompany the questions with explanations and instructions on how to answer them. That way, pairs of questions and explanations evolve, which are located in the Instructions and in the Questions parts of that scenario, respectively. With this partitioning, one may first give an exact explanation of the problem and state where and how to look for critical elements, and then point to the questions examining the problem domain. These questions are those extracted from the VIDs. They are rather short but may require some time to be answered.
For example, consider these questions: "When are access rights for other entities in the system on this resource set? Before or after opening the resource?" To answer these questions, it is necessary to know how to recognize used resources and how to set access rights for them. Such explanations are located in the Instructions part of the scenario. Whenever these explanations contain hints dependent on an operating system or programming language, French parentheses are used.
As an example, consider the following explanations: "In <<Linux/Unix>>, you would, for example, search for commands like "chmod" or "umask"…In <<Linux/Unix>> the locks implemented by internal <<Java>> commands are only regarded by other <<Java>> programs."
The instructions are normally divided into a general area and one or more specialized areas. The general area leads to the different specialized areas and shows, on the one hand, which elements to examine, and on the other hand, how to choose the right specialized area. Those specialized areas focus on one topic related to the vulnerability examined and demonstrate how to check the chosen elements accordingly.
The example shown in Figures 3 and 4 begins with general explanations about unchecked error conditions, followed by the specialized areas "try-/catch-blocks" and "special values". They both contain assignments on what to do and explanations on how this can be done. The part "special values" demonstrates that explanations can include code constructs and specializations regarding target systems. This part is completed by links to the appropriate section with questions and by short advice regarding the workflow. The instructions lead the user to the appropriate questions, which in turn lead him or her through the steps necessary to examine the problem under inspection. Combined with the guidance on how to select the correct elements and the correct path through the inspection, the scenarios provide detailed guidance on how to conduct a security inspection and how to treat different elements.
The instructions themselves may be as detailed as stepby-step instructions, depending on the underlying complexity.
C. Questions
The last part contains the questions. Due to the detailed instructions, this part is rather short compared to the others.
At the beginning of each Questions part, advice is given regarding one correct way of implementing the securitycritical elements. Clarifications showing how and when the questions have to be answered follow. The extraction of questions is rather simple and mainly consists of a slight reformulation of the questions from the VIDs.
When comparing VIDs and their corresponding scenarios, one can see that the scenarios contain more questions than the VIDs do. These additional questions serve the purpose of guiding the inspector. They point to circumstances that are important for correctly answering subsequent questions but that may be easily overlooked.
Since the VIDs, on the one hand, presume expert knowledge and, on the other hand, do not focus on the engineering domain, such additional data are not contained in the VIDs.
If the inspector has sufficient knowledge, these additional questions are not necessary for conducting an inspection. But inspectors usually are not security experts. Since security problems may be "subtle and easy to overlook" [1] , we need to provide this additional guidance. Otherwise, the inspection threatens to fail, since the inspectors may not always be able to identify a security problem [1] .
As an example, consider the following questions regarding thrown exceptions not contained in the respective VID: "Is it possible to pass the "throw" on to other calling functions? Take a look at "Chain of Throwing"; how far does this "chain of throwing" reach for the function you are examining right now? Where does the handling take place?"
In short, the derivation of critical questions is straightforward, but the formulation of optional questions is an informal process dependent on the thematic complexity and the security knowledge of the inspectors.
V. USAGE
A fictitious example shall demonstrate the usage of our scenarios. An inspector, Ms. Seesalot, is using our Security Inspection Scenarios for conducting inspections. She received some basic training before, but she is not a security expert. When starting the inspection, she initially reads the introduction, as seen in Figure 3 . Here, Ms. Seesalot will see her goal, to ensure that every possible error is either caught within or outside the function creating this error.
Following the guidance, Ms. Seesalot now identifies every function that may produce an error. For each of these, she selects "try-/catch-blocks" or "special values", as appropriate. Since Ms. Seesalot has read the instructions, she is aware of difficulties such as runtime-exceptions or platform-dependent errors and can handle them.
Inside the try-/catch-blocks section, Ms. Seesalot follows the advice given, and ensures there is a catch-block for every single exception thrown. She does not miss any catch-block, because using the "chain of throwing" principle, she can identify even those errors treated "multiple method calls away". Out of those exceptions identified, three were not treated appropriately.
Inside the special values section, Ms. Seesalot reads the advice and thus ensures that every special value returned is clearly distinguishable from legal values and that for every single legal value an entry exists in a white list. She also checks whether every returned object possibly containing an error code is actually checked for an error code. She marks two error codes that are not checked for properly, one location where if-else statements are used, and two special values not clearly distinguishable from legal values.
In general, the SIS focuses Ms. Seesalot to certain potential vulnerabilities in the corresponding document and thus increases the likelihood in finding such problems.
VI. ANALYSIS
As we have seen, scenarios can be used to conduct vulnerability-based code inspections. Risk analyses, threat analyses, or experiences may lead to priorities, i.e., certain vulnerability classes especially crucial for one's own situation. These can then be targeted by the presented SIS.
As explained, inspections are not meant to substitute testing; they complement this technique. In fact, this may lead to great savings, since for every bug removed during an inspection, one can save up to "nine hours of testing, debugging and fixing the code" [6] . Additionally, code inspections "are also anywhere from 20 to 30 times more effective at finding bugs than relying only on testing" [6] .
Another positive effect is the possibility to unburden security experts. VIDs do contain security expertise and thus, security experts have to create them. But the scenarios just inherit the expertise contained in VIDs. Therefore, it is not necessary to task security experts with the creation of the SIS when the VIDs are already available, but we recommend a security expert to review the scenarios before using them.
Due to the extensive amount of guidance in the scenarios, experts also do not need to inspect the code themselves. They have provided knowledge during the VID creation phase and possibly by providing some basic security training for the inspectors. Generally, everyone conducting security inspections should have received basic security training.
The experts may support inspectors facing difficult situations on an on-demand basis. Additionally, they can review the results, or participate in the inspection meeting where findings are reported. Though security experts are possibly the best source when looking for security problems, the situation in practice is usually such that experts are rare and expensive. Based on inspection experiences in general, we believe that providing non-experts with the necessary reading support leads to good defect detection rates (effectiveness) and thus, improved quality. Moreover, the non-experts become more experienced the more often the security scenarios are applied. These arrangements lead to relieving security experts from their workload and to training new inspectors.
Also, experts do not need to create VIDs or review scenarios every time a security inspection is pending. They may be saved and just reused. There is no need for additional effort, except in two situations.
First, there is a need to instantiate the generic scenarios according to the programming language and the operating system targeted. This is because different programming languages and operating systems have different behaviors and thus, we have to account for these special circumstances. So, when a new language or a new operating system is used, we have to adapt the scenarios accordingly.
Second, we have to update scenarios over time, e.g., to cover new technical developments. This is similar to the fact that people have to be trained "often because the security landscape changes rapidly" [6] .
VII. EVALUATION
The Security Inspection Scenarios have been presented to the SHIELDS consortium, and based on reviews and feedback from our research and industry partners, we have improved the scenarios.
Currently, we are setting up an experiment to validate the following assumptions regarding Security Inspection Scenarios: With the help of SIS, it is possible for non-experts to conduct security inspections. Both effectiveness and efficiency shall reside on a level comparable to that of experts. Non-experts lack security knowledge and experience to conduct security inspections the way an expert is able to.
Our Security Inspection Scenarios provide the expertise and the guidance needed by non-experts and thus, should be able to close this gap.
For the evaluation, we have developed a web application called "RentABook". The software has several vulnerabilities, which we built in on purpose. Examples are SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities, or weak mechanisms like improper access controls or weak password recovery.
To conduct the evaluation, we are going to use two groups: Security experts and non-experts. Both groups will perform an inspection. Non-experts will receive support by Security Inspection Scenarios, while experts may choose whatever they like. Since we want to gain reliable values, experts should inspect code just like they are used to.
After the inspection, we will compare the results of both groups regarding time and vulnerabilities found. This should enable us to assess our assumptions regarding effectiveness and efficiency of inspections done by non-experts using SIS compared to those done by experts.
Additionally, we will gather feedback to improve the feasibility of the scenarios. Other results, like instances of vulnerability classes that were not found although corresponding SIS did exist, may lead to further insights.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
So far, we have created 12 Security Inspection Scenarios as reading support for non-experts conducting security code inspections. These scenarios were derived from VIDs, which were developed first and capture necessary security knowledge [11] [12] . Security expertise is needed for effective security inspections, but inspectors usually are not security experts. This is the gap we addressed by providing Security Inspection Scenarios, which capture security knowledge and provide appropriate guidance for inspectors.
We have shown how to transfer the security expertise contained in VIDs to our SIS. To cope with the complexity related to security, we provide detailed guidance. Introduction, Instructions, and Questions sections are utilized to create a clear and comprehensible structure. We have learned that vulnerabilities can be related to programming languages and operating systems, and thus we instantiated our SIS.
Such constructions may raise questions regarding whether they are needed as well as effort and / or cost factors compared to traditional approaches. As stated before, we are convinced that they are valuable, and propose an application, which may be included in most development lifecycles that include security activities.
Our next steps are to conduct the evaluation and analyze the results. We are also developing an inspection tool, which should serve as further support for inspectors. This tool should present momentarily relevant parts of both the SIS and the code to the inspectors. Furthermore, it should guide users through the inspection and enable them to mark certain code locations for further examination. After an inspection, the tool should automatically create reports based on the inspector's decisions and rationales.
